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Abstract
Does adverse selection hamper the effectiveness of voluntary risk sharing? How do differ-
ences in risk profiles affect adverse selection? We experimentally investigate individuals’
willingness to share risks with others. Across treatments we vary how risk profiles differ
between individuals. We find strong evidence for adverse selection if individuals risk profiles
can be ranked according to first-order stochastic dominance and only little evidence for
adverse selection if risk profiles can only be ranked on the basis of second-order stochastic
dominance. We observe the same pattern also for anticipated adverse selection. These
results suggest that the degree to which adverse selection erodes voluntary risk sharing
arrangements crucially depends on the form of risk heterogeneity.
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1 Introduction
Adverse selection can undermine the viability of voluntary social insurance and risk sharing
arrangements. In case individuals with the most favorable risk profile are unwilling to join a
risk pool, those with the next most favorable risk profile will also be unwilling to join and so
on. In the end, only those individuals with the least attractive risk profile will be part of the
risk sharing arrangement. This mechanism of (unraveling) adverse selection is often advanced
as an argument in favor of mandatory participation in social insurance and similar risk sharing
schemes.
Despite its key role in the economics of insurance and risk sharing, the empirical evidence for
the force of adverse selection is not particularly strong. Fenger (2009) studies some European
countries in which individuals have attained the possibility to limit their participation in welfare
schemes, such as health policies, unemployment policies and pension schemes. He concludes that
there is no convincing evidence for adverse selection. The results for private insurance markets
are more ambiguous, with evidence for adverse selection in some markets (health insurance,
annuities), but not in others (life insurance, long term care). It is not clear why the evidence
is mixed. One possibility is that very risk averse individuals not only have a higher demand for
insurance, but may also behave more cautiously. A favorable risk profile may then go hand-in-
hand with a high insurance coverage (Cutler et al., 2008). It may also be that individuals do not
really know how their risk profile compares to that of others, in which case the scope for adverse
selection is seriously reduced (Cohen and Siegelman, 2010).
In this paper we use laboratory experiments to investigate the behavioral relevance of adverse
selection. A major advantage of the experimental approach is randomization. Decision makers
can be randomly assigned to risk profiles thus ruling out any endogeneity bias. Another advantage
is that participants can be informed on how their risk profile compares to that of others, so that
this cannot be an obstacle for adverse selection. Even under these circumstances, however, it
is still an open question whether selection effects will actually occur. Adverse selection places
rather strong demands on the rationality of individuals. It relies on their ex-ante ability to
predict whether a risk sharing arrangement will lead to favorable redistribution ex-post. To
do so requires them to anticipate the risk sharing decisions of others, and to adjust their own
decisions accordingly. Moreover, the literature on social preferences (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt,
1999) suggests that even participants with a favorable risk profile may be willing to subsidize, in
expectation, those with less favorable prospects.
In our experiment we implement a setup in which three individuals simultaneously decide
whether they want to share their risks. Risks are simple two-outcome lotteries, and realizations
are independent across players. Individuals make sharing decisions before the risks materialize.
2
Those individuals who decide to share their risks, divide (proportionally) the sum of the realized
incomes among themselves. Across treatments we implement different forms of risk heterogeneity
by varying the two outcomes of the lotteries and/or the corresponding probabilities. Lotteries
can vary in mean outcomes (leading to first-order stochastic dominance relations), vary in spread
(leading to second-order stochastic dominance relations), or vary in both mean and spread (with
a potential conflict between the two). Risk profiles are common knowledge.
Our results display strong evidence for adverse selection in settings in which risk profiles can
be ranked on the basis of first-order stochastic dominance. Individuals with a good risk are much
less willing to enter a risk sharing arrangement than individuals with a bad risk. In addition,
there is clear evidence for strategic adverse selection, which leads to unraveling. Individuals with
an intermediate risk anticipate adverse selection of good risks and are in consequence less willing
to share risk in this heterogeneous setting compared to a setting in which all individuals have
the same (intermediate) risks. At the same time, our results display little evidence for adverse
selection in case risks can only be ranked according to second-order stochastic dominance. When
the bad risk is a mean-preserving spread of the good risk, this is no cause for adverse selection.
Hence, what mainly seems to matter for adverse selection is differences in mean, not differences
in spread.
Two other results are noteworthy. First, even though the observed comparative statics co-
incide with the (calibrated) predictions, the level of adverse selection is much less pronounced
than might be expected. Second, even in case risk profiles are identical, so that adverse selection
cannot be an issue, the overall level of voluntary risk sharing is lower than predicted.
We are not the first who experimentally study risk sharing, but to the best of our knowledge
we are the first to study adverse selection. One of the earliest studies on risk sharing is Selten
and Ockenfels (1998), who implement a three-player setting in which all players have the same
probability of winning some income. Before the risks materialize, players decide simultaneously
how much they will give to the losing player(s) in case they win. Their results indicate that a
majority of the winners are willing to transfer money to the loser(s). Several papers build on this
so-called solidarity game and study, for instance, the role of group size (Chaudhuri et al., 2010)
or the role of reciprocity in a repeated setting (Charness and Genicot, 2007). An important
feature of these papers is that the transfer decision is made conditional on being a winner. In
this sense, risk sharing is ex-post, which is an important difference with our design where risks
are shared ex-ante and decisions cannot be conditioned on the realization of risks.
Barr and Genicot (2008) conduct a field experiment in Zimbabwe where individuals can choose
whether or not to share their stochastic income with other members of a group before risks are
realized. An important difference with our paper is that risk profiles are endogenous: subjects
3
choose from a set of lotteries before they decide about risk sharing. Moreover, the authors focus
on the effect of commitment and examine what happens to the level of risk sharing if participants
have the option to opt out after the incomes are realized. This is quite different from our paper
which focuses on adverse selection, that is, not participating in risk sharing before incomes are
realized.
2 Design and Procedures
We implement four treatments that differ with respect to the risks that are assigned within
sharing groups. Individuals are informed about their own and others’ risk exposure, but face
unertainty about the actual outcome of the risks when making their decision about how much risk
to share with their group members. This depicts an intermediate position between what John
Rawls calls and individual’s ’original position’ behind the veil of ignorance and that beyond the
veil (see Rawls, 1971). We first describe the lottery assignment process and point out treatment
differences. We then proceed with describing the risk sharing procedure and the experimental
procedures including the elicitation of risk preferences.
2.1 Lottery Assignment
At the beginning of a session each participant is randomly assigned to one of the four treatments
and a matching group with two other participants. Each of them faces a lottery that eventually
results in a high income Y Hi with probability pi or a low income Y
l
i with probability (1 − pi).
The exact specification of the parameters depends on the treatment and which of three possible
lottery types an individual is assigned to.
Table 1 gives an overview of the different lotteries seperated by treatment. It specifies pi,
Y Hi , Y
l
i , as well as the expected lottery value µ and the lottery spread δ. The design of our
treatments allows to investigate voluntary risk sharing under different forms of risk heterogeneity.
In particular, we can observe to what extent the occurence of selection effects hampers the
effectiveness of risk sharing and to what extent risk sharing is reduced compared to a situation
where risks are homogeneous. In the benchmark HO treatment all participants face identical
risks. Risk sharing thus implies that income is redistributed from the fortunate to the less
fortunate individuals ex-post. In the HEδ treatment individuals also face the same µ, however,
lottery spreads are different with δ1 > δ2 > δ3 which implies second-order stochastic dominance
between lotteries. In the HEµ treatment expected lottery values differ with µ1 > µ2 > µ3, so
that the above average risk of some individuals can be expected to be spread across the sharing
group. Individuals face different probabilities for the same possible lottery outcomes. The HEµδ
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Table 1: Treatments
HO p YHi Y
l
i µ δ
Type 1 0.5 130 20 75 110
Type 2 0.5 130 20 75 110
Type 3 0.5 130 20 7 110
HEδ p YHi Y
l
i µ δ
Type 1 0.5 150 0 75 150
Type 2 0.5 130 20 75 110
Type 3 0.5 110 40 75 70
HEµδ p YHi Y
l
i µ δ
Type 1 0.5 216 0 108 216
Type 2 0.5 130 20 75 110
Type 3 0.5 52 32 42 20
HEµ p YHi Y
l
i µ δ
Type 1 0.8 130 20 108 110
Type 2 0.5 130 20 75 110
Type 3 0.2 130 20 42 110
treatment combines the previous two forms of risk heterogeneity. The means as well as the lottery
spreads are different across group members with µ1 > µ2 > µ3 and δ1 > δ2 > δ3. In order to
make treatments comparable, the overall expected income within a risk sharing group is the
same for all treatments. Moreover, the expected lottery values are identical in treatments HEµ
and HEµδ for each lottery type. Importantly, the risk exposure of lottery type two is identical
across treatments.
2.2 Risk Sharing Mechanism
Individual lotteries are public information to all group members. Each participant is asked to
choose a risk sharing level si ∈ [0, 1] which represents the fraction of his eventual income that is
placed in the group account G =
∑3
i=1(si ·Yi). This group account is then proportionally divided
among all group members. An individual’s earnings are consequently defined as
Πi(si, sj) = (1− si) · Yi + ri ·G (1)
with ri =
si∑3
j=1 sj
being the percentage that an individual receives from the group account and
which is proportional to the own risk sharing level. The more risk is shared, the more incomes
are equalized ex-post. If all individuals choose complete risk sharing, si = 1, eventual earnings of
al group members will be identical. The total amount earned in a group, however, is uncertain,
since risks are not correlated. If all individuals decide not to share risks at all, each participant’s
earnings will solely depend on his individual lottery outcome.
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2.3 Procedures
Each participant was randomly assigned to a computer in the laboratory based on a random draw
from a pile of numbered cards. Instructions were provided on the computer and a summary of the
most important aspects was provided on paper. Thereafter, participants were asked to answer
a few comprehension questions concerning the group account, individual payments, returns and
final incomes in order to ensure their understanding of the risk sharing mechanism. When all
subjects had correctly answered the questions, the experiment was started. Participants were
asked to make risk sharing decisions in three consecutive periods in the same treatment. The
group constitution changed in each period as well as the assigned lottery type, so that each
participant was assigned each lottery type once. No feedback about lottery outcomes or sharing
decisions was provided until the very end of the experiment. At the end of the experiment a
random mechanism determined which of the three periods would be relevant for payment.
In addition to the risk sharing decisions in each period we also elicited subject’s beliefs about
the other group members’ decisions by asking them to state the intervals they expect the sharing
decision of the other two group members to be in. Belief elicitation was incentiviced using the
interval scoring rule (Schlag and van der Weele, 2009). If the actual sharing decision lay between
the intervall borders Il and IH , the participant was rewarded based on its length: the smaller the
interval, the higher the payoff. If the actual decision was outside the interval the participant’s
payoff was zero. For our analysis we calculated an individual i’s belief about individual j’s risk
sharing level as sˆj =
IjH+Ijl
2 (i 6= j).
In the second part of the experiment we elicited individuals’ risk preferences.1 We applied
the multiple choice list method (Harrison and Cox, 2008). Certainty equivalents were elicited for
the seven different lotteries that subjects could face in the first part. For each lottery individuals
were asked to make 20 choices between a sure amount and the respective lottery. The sure
amount varies between Y Hi and Y
l
i . Certainty equivalents are calculated as the arithmetic mean
of the smallest sure amount preferred to the lottery and the consecutive sure amount on the
list. Each individuals’ risk attitude α was then computed by minimizing the squared distances
between the certainty equivalents observed and those theoretically predicted by expected utility
theory assuming a utility function for money U(x) = xα (see Wakker, 2008, Wakker, 2010). That
is:
min
α
7∑
i=m
[(pm(Y
H
m )
α + (1− pm)(Y lm)α)
1
α − cem]2
with cem being the elicited certainty equivalent of lottery m = 1, ..7. The resulting measure
αi = 1 for risk neutral individuals, αi < 1 for risk averse individuals and αi > 1 for risk seeking
1See appendix A.2 for instructions.
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individuals.
Lastly, participants were asked to answer a short questionnaire, were provided with informa-
tion about lottery outcomes and earnings and were then paid in cash and dismissed from the
laboratory. Participants were recruited online with the system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The
computerized experiment was conducted in the Behavioural & Experimental Economics labo-
ratory of Maastricht University (BEElab) using the experimental software z-tree (Fischbacher,
2007). The experimental earnings were calculated as Experimental Currency Units (ECU) with
a conversion rate of 1 ECU=0.04 Euros. In total, 120 students participated in the one and a half
hour long experiment. Average earnings were approximately 18 Euros.
3 Theoretical background
In our experiment each of the three individuals i = 1, 2, 3 in a group faces a lottery which leads
to a high income Y Hi with probability pi and to a low income Y
l
i with probability (1− pi). Each
individual indpendendly decides on how much risk to share, by deciding on the share si of his
eventual (ex-post) income he puts into the group account. This share, together with the sum of
shares of the other individuals, determines the individual’s return from the group account. To
make an optimal sharing decision each indivdual has to consider each others (expected) sharing
decision.
More formally, denote sˆj (j 6= i) as i’s belief about the other group members’ sharing decisions.
When making the sharing decision, each indivual has to consider the overall lottery with the
eight possible realizations Πik(si, sˆj) (k = 1, 2, ..., 8) for the different combinations of high and
low incomes together with the expected sharing decisions of others. Each of these possible
realizations is given by
Πik(si, sˆi) = (1− si) · Yik + si
si +
∑
j 6=i sˆj
· (
∑
j 6=i
sˆj · Yjk + si · Yik), (2)
where Yik denotes individual i’s ex-post income (high or low) in the k
th realization. Denote
pk as the probability with which each of the eight realizations occur, then an expected utility
maximizing individual i chooses si such that
max
si
EUi =
8∑
k=1
pk · U [Πik(si, sˆj)]. (3)
Assume that individuals’ risk preferences can be represented by the power utility function
U(x) = xα. Then it can be shown that in treatment HO full risk sharing (s1 = s2 = s3 = 1) is
an equilibrium for all α < 1. In HEδ joint risk sharing (s1 > 0, s2 > 0, s3 > 0) is an equilibrium
for all α < 1 whereas in HEµδ it is an equilibrium only for some α < 1. Finally, in HEµ joint
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risk sharing is never an equilibrium because the lowest risk type will never share (s1 = 0). Hence,
in the aggregate we expect that joint risk sharing is highest in HO, second highest in HEδ, third
highest in HEµδ, and lowest in HEµ.
4 Results
In this section we first report the aggregate risk sharing decisons and how they change across
treatments and lottery types. Second, we compare the empirical results to theoretical bench-
mark conditions taking into account individual risk preferences and beliefs about others’ sharing
decisions. Finally, we explore potential strategic adverse selection by investigating how beliefs
about other risk sharing decisions affect one’s own sharing decision.
4.1 Risk sharing and adverse selection
At the moment of their risk sharing decisions subjects do not know the realizations of their
lotteries. Hence, a natural measure of aggregate risk sharing is the ex-ante expected amount
of money in the group account: the sum over individuals’ risk sharing percentages times the
expected value of their lotteries.2 Using this measure, Figure 1 shows that risk sharing is highest
in HO and HEδ, smaller in HEµδ and smallest in HEµ. This is roughly in line with the
theoretically predicted ranking, except that risk sharing levels do not differ between HO and
HEδ. A Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test indicates that significant differences between treatments exist
(p = 0.0347).3 Pair-wise comparisons with Mann-Whitney (MW) tests reveal, that in HEµ the
expected amount in the group account is significantly smaller than in HO and HEδ (p ≤ 0.0283;
FDR corrected at 10% level). Other pair-wise comparisons yield weaker significance (p ≥ 0.0758,
FDR corrected insignificant).
Result 1. Risk sharing and riskiness
(1) Compared to the theoretical benchmark, too little risk is shared when risk is equally distributed.
(2) As predicted risk sharing decreases with differences in individuals’ risk profiles. Specifically,
it is smallest when individuals’ risk profiles differ according to first-order stochastic dominance.
The reported aggregate sharing decisions conceal considerable differences between different
lottery types within and across treatments. However, Figure 2 shows average risk sharing sep-
2An alternative measure would be the expected amount of transfers implied by a risk sharing scheme. Using
this measure leads to similar results but it is considerably more complex to calculate.
3Throughout the paper, we correct p-values using the false discovery rate (FDR) whenever we carry out multiple
pair-wise comparisons. This method reduces the risk of false positives and controls for the rate of false negatives
(Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). All reported tests are 2-sided.
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Figure 1: Expected amount in group account (percent)
arately for each lottery type in each treatment. As expected, in HO, where all individuals in a
group have the same risk profile, a Wilcoxon signed-ranks (WS) test yields that subjects with
different labels (i.e, 1, 2, or 3) exhibit statistically indistinguishable risk sharing decisions (51.7%,
53.3%, 52.3%; p ≥ 0.992).
In HEδ, where individual risk profiles can be ranked according to second-order stochastic
dominance, lottery types decrease in their riskiness from left (lottery type 1) to right (lottery
type 3). Adverse selection would predict decreasing risk sharing in the same direction. The
figure shows that empirically risk sharing is highest when participants are assigned lottery type
2 (62.2%) followed by lottery type 1 (55%) and lottery type 3 (47.7%). A WS test yields that
the difference in risk sharing between lottery type 2 and 3 is significant at the FDR-corrected 5%
level (p = 0.013). As all other pair-wise comparisons return insignificant results (p ≥ 0.432), we
consider this as only weak evidence in favor of adverse selection when individuals’ risk profiles
can be ranked according to second-order stochastic dominance.
In HEµδ and HEµ results are very different. In both treatments, risk sharing levels of
lottery types clearly increase from left (lottery type 1) to right (lottery type 3). This correlates
negatively with the expected values of the lottery types, which increase from right to left, and
clearly indicates the existence of adverse selection when risk profiles can be ranked according
to first-order stochastic dominance. Specifically, in HEµ individuals with the low expected
value (bad risk) lottery type 3 choose on average a risk sharing level of 77.4%, those with an
intermediate risk profile (lottery type 2) choose a level of 36.5%, and those with a high expected
value (good risk) choose a sharing level of only 17.9%. Pairwise WS tests reveal that differences
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Figure 2: Risk sharing per lottery type (in percent)
between lottery types are statistically significant at the FDR-corrected 5% level (p ≤ 0.001).
With a difference of about 60 percentage points between the low and high expected value lottery
type, adverse selection effects are also of economic significance.
In HEµδ risk increases from left (lottery type 1) to right (lottery type 3) in terms of expected
values but decreases in terms of outcome spreads.4 Hence, regarding adverse selection effects,
individuals’ ranking of risk profiles according to first- and second-order stochastic dominance
work in opposite directions. These countervailing effects on adverse selection are empirically
reflected by the less extreme differences in sharing across lottery types. As in HEµ, sharing is
still highest for lottery type 3 (60.3%), intermediate for lottery type 2 (48.1%), and lowest for
lottery type 1 (40.1%). However, the difference between the two extreme lottery types is with
20.2 percentage points less stark than in HEµ and not all differences are statistically significant.
Pair wise comparisons with WS tests show that between lottery type 3 and lottery types 1 and
4In the following we will refer to the risk of lottery type 1 as the ‘good’ risk in HEµδ and HEµ, whereas in
HEδ lottery type 3 is the ‘good’ risk.
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2 the differences are statistically significant at the FDR-corrected 5% level (p ≤ 0.027) but not
between lottery type 1 and 2 (p = 0.216).
Result 2. Adverse selection and risk profiles
(1) If individuals’ risk profiles are ranked according to second-order stochastic dominance little
adverse selection is observed.
(2) If individuals’ risk profiles are ranked according to first-order stochastic dominance there is
strong evidence for adverse selection.
(3) The adverse selection effect due to riskiness according to first-order stochastic dominance is
mitigated by decreased riskiness due to second-order stochastic dominance.
To get a better idea how the empirical results compare to theoretically predicted behavior we
calculated the individually optimal risk sharing levels for each subject for each lottery type using
the elicited individual risk preference and beliefs about others sharing decisions.5 Specifically, we
assume that the preferences of each subject i can be represented by a utility function for money
Ui(x) = x
αi , where the individual risk parameter αi is estimated as described in Section 2.3.
Further, we use the elicited beliefs of i about others’ sharing decisons sˆj to solve for each i the
maximization problem in Equation (3), given the possible realizations in Equation (2).
In Figure 2 the black crosses indicate the average of these individually optimal risk sharing
levels. Two regularities are immediately eye-catching. First, for each treatment, across types the
changes in sharing levels fit the theoretical comparative statics results qualitatively very well.
‘Bad’ risk lottery types are predicted to share more than intermediate risk lottery types than
‘good’ risk lottery types. Second, quantitatively the empirical sharing levels sometimes diverge
significantly from the individually optimal ones.
In HO actual risk sharing is significantly lower than theoretically predicted (p ≤ 0.032 for
all lottery types, WS tests). In HEδ, however, empirical risk sharing levels do not differ from
predicted ones for any lottery type (p ≥ 0.128, WS tests). In HEµ and HEµδ predicted adverse
selection is stronger than it is actually the case. In HEµ, for all three lottery types differences
between theoretical and empirical sharing levels are statistically significant (p ≤ 0.024, WS tests).
In HEµδ differences between theoretically predicted and empirically observed sharing levels are
significant for lottery types 1 and 3 (p ≤ 0.001, WS tests) but not for lottery type 2 (p = 0.724,
WS test).
5Note that this does not give an equilibrium prediction but rather a ‘na¨ıve’ optimal decision for each individual.
We consider such na¨ıve behavior of our subjects as more realistic than equilibrium behavior for at least two reasons.
First, the latter would ask for complex computations our subjects unlikely went through. Second, it also requires
common knowledge of all individuals risk preferences, information our subjects did not have and also could not
acquire as all sharing decisions were only made once.
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Result 3. Individually optimal and empirical adverse selection.
(1) Qualitatively, empirically observed adverse selection coincides with individually optimal ad-
verse selection: risk sharing correlates with risk profiles in the predicted way.
(2) Quantitatively, adverse selection is less pronounced than individually optimal risk sharing
would dictate.
4.2 Anticipated and strategic adverse selection
An important element of our experimental design is that individuals with an intermediate risk
profile (lottery type 2) faced exactly the same individual lottery and, hence, risk exposure in
all treatments, whereas the risk profiles of the other lottery types systematically varied across
treatments. Moreover, the sum of the expected values of lottery types 1 and 2 is also identical
in all treatments.
In Section 4.1 we have seen that risk sharing of individuals with intermediate risk profile is
highest in HO and Hδ, lowest in Hµ, and intermediate in Hµδ.6 This strongly suggests that
these differences are a response to anticipated adverse selection and, hence, strategic. We use the
beliefs that subjects with intermediate risk profiles have about other lottery types’ risk sharing
to investigate whether adverse selection is indeed anticipated. If so, we should see differences in
beliefs of lottery type 2 regarding the other types’ risk sharing levels across treatments, which
should correlate with actual risk sharing of lottery types 1 and 3.
Figure 3 reports the average risk sharing levels of lottery types 1 and 3, expected by lottery
type 2. It shows that beliefs about other types are clearly in line with these types’ actual behavior
(cf. Figure 2). There are no statistically significant differences between type 2’s beliefs and the
actual behavior of types 1 and 3 (p ≥ 0.1985, MW tests). This is corroborated by a regression
analysis showing that risk sharing of lottery type 2 individuals is positively correlated with the
anticipated risk sharing by the ‘good’ risk risk lottery type (see Appendix A).
Result 4. Risk profiles, anticipated and strategic adverse selection.
(1) Intermediate risk types, with a constant risk profile, exhibit varying degrees of adverse selec-
tion across treatments.
(2) Intermediate risk types exhibit strategic adverse selection as their own adverse selection cor-
relates with their correctly anticipated adverse selection of other risk types.
6The differences in sharing levels are FDR-corrected (marginally) significant different between Hµ and HO and
Hδ and between Hδ and Hµδ (p ≤ 0.0318, MW tests).
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Note: The label lt# stands for lottery type #.
Figure 3: Belief of lottery type 2 about other lottery types’ sharing levels (in percent)
5 Conclusion and Discussion
We experimentally investigate how heterogeneity in risks affects voluntary risk sharing. Partici-
pants are asked to decide how much risk they are willing to share knowing their and others’ risk
profiles but facing uncertainty about risk outcomes. The results provide behavioral evidence for
the relevance of adverse selection. Individuals with a ‘good’ risk profile are less likely to enter a
risk sharing arrangement than individuals with a ‘bad’ risk profile. The strength of the effect,
however, depends on the manner in which the risk profiles vary between individuals. Risks which
differ in terms of mean outcomes (first-order stochastic dominance) generate much stronger se-
lection effects than risks which differ by way of mean-preserving spreads (second-order stochastic
dominance).
Qualitatively, our results are in line with the theoretical predictions, assuming CRRA utility
maximization. The observed treatment effects line up nicely with the theoretical comparative
statics. Risk sharing levels are higher in treatments in which risk sharing is an equilibrium under
a wider set of parameters. Moreover, calibrated predictions at the individual level using elicited
risk preferences and beliefs correlate strongly with observed decisions. Quantitatively, however,
point predictions are often off the mark. Specifically, we find that risk sharing levels are generally
less extreme than predicted. For example, in a symmetric environment with homogenous risks,
risk sharing levels are about 30%-points lower than predicted. Also, selection effects generally
fall short of the prediction. It should be realized, however, that our experiment is single shot,
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and that participants have no opportunity for learning. In future work, it would be interesting
to explore how risk sharing and adverse selection develop over time with repeated interaction
and with learning.
In many countries there are continuing debates on whether mandatory insurance should be
introduced for some risks (think of Obamacare), while in others countries (partial) exit options
are being proposed for certain collective arrangements (such as mandatory occupational pension
schemes). A key issue in the public debate, at least in Europe, is whether the option to opt
out may undermine ’solidarity’, where the lucky support the unlucky. Although one must be
cautious to generalize from lab to field, our results suggest that such concerns are well-founded
behaviorally. At the same time, our results indicate that much will depend on the manner and
degree to which risk profiles differ. The easier it is to order different risk profiles from ‘good’ to
‘bad’, the stronger selection effects are likely to be.
Finally, one may question whether our design is somehow biased towards finding certain
effects. Indeed, in our experiment participants risk profiles are common knowledge. This may
lead to an overestimation of the importance of selection for environments in which people do
not have very precise knowledge about how their risk profile compares to that of others. On
the other hand, however, in our experiment risks profiles are assigned exogenously. This may
underestimate the force of adverse selection for settings in which risks are endogenous. The
support for redistribution is typically higher in case poverty is caused by bad luck rather than a
lack of effort (Cappelen et al., 2012). Similarly, low risk individuals may be (even) less willing
to share risk with high risk individuals in case they perceive that those are accountable for their
risk (see Cettolin and Tausch, 2013). Future work will have to establish which of these elements
are more or less important for the behavioral relevance of adverse selection.
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A Additional regression analysis
We observe that the more individuals with lottery type 2 expect the ‘good’ risk lottery type to
share, the more they share themselves. This can be seen from the regression results below. The
dependent variable is lottery type 2’s risk sharing level. The variable Belief goodrisk is lottery
type 2’s belief about the sharing level of the good risk type.
Table 2: Effect of anticipated risk sharing of ‘good’ risk type on lottery type 2’s sharing decision
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
HEµδ -8.826 (5.596)
HEµ -9.815 (6.470)
Gender -4.220 (4.482)
Age 1.006 (1.093)
Belief goodrisk 0.488∗∗ (0.097)
Intercept 32.496 (24.612)
Note: ** 5% significance level; treatment HO not included; treatment
HEδ is the omitted treatment category; session dummies included but
not reported.
B Experimental Instructions
B.1 Risk Sharing Part
[Instructions Part 1]
On the following screens you will be informed about the lottery that is randomly assigned to
you as well as the lotteries that are randomly assigned to the other two group members.
You will be asked what percentage of your lottery outcome you put into the group account.
When making this decision your lottery outcome and the other participant’s lottery outcomes
have not yet been randomly determined. The other two group members are faced with the
same decision situations. The earnings in a decision situation will depend on all group members
decisions in the way just described in the practice examples.
You will be asked to report your best guesses of how each of the other two members will decide.
Specifically, for each other member you will be asked to report the interval in which you believe
their decisions will lie. That is, you will report your best guess of the smallest and largest
percentage each of the other two will put into the group account. With these guesses you can
earn extra money and you will earn the more money the more accurate your guess is.
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Your earnings from this task are determined in the following way: If another’s actual chosen
percentage is outside your guessed interval (that is, is smaller than your smallest guess or larger
than your largest guess) then you earn nothing with your guess. If another’s actual chosen
percentage is inside your guessed interval (that is, is equal or larger than your smallest guess
and equal or smaller than your largest guess) then you earn the more the smaller your chosen
interval is. For instance, if you guess one particular percentage Z% (the interval Z% − Z%),
and the other member indeed puts this particular percentage Z% into the group account then
you earn the maximal amount of 15 ECU with your guess. If you guess that the percentage
will lie in the interval 0% − 100% then you will earn 0 ECU. For intermediate intervals you
earn in proportion to the length of the interval. For example, if you choose 28% − 48%
and the other’s chosen actual percentage is 32% (that is, inside the interval) then you earn
15 − 15 ∗ ((48 − 28)/100) = 15 − 15 ∗ 0.2 = 12 ECU; if you would have chosen 16% − 67% you
would have earned 15− 15 ∗ 0.51 = 7.35 ECU.
The total earnings are the sum of your earnings resulting from your and the others actual
decisions and the earnings resulting from your guesses.
This is an example screen shot of the first decision task. You are not asked to make choices now!
Please have a careful look. In this example you are participant A. You are asked to enter in the
field below, emphasized by the red round frame, what percentage of your lottery outcome you
want to put into the group account.
This is an example screen shot of the second decision task. You are not asked to make choices
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now! Please have a careful look. In this example you are asked to enter in the field emphasized
with the red round frame, what you think in which interval participant B’s choice X will be in
that particular decision situation. In the field next to ’LOW’ you enter the lower bound of the
interval, in the field next to ’UP’ you enter the upper bound of the interval. Take care that you
don’t exchange them! You do the same for the guess about participant C’s decision below.
You now enter the actual decision stage! The entries you make on the next screens will be
relevant for your payment.
- Decisions for part 1 are made -
[Instructions Part 2]
You are now again matched with two other participants and confronted with the same decision
situation as on the previous screens. However, this time you face a different lottery than in the
first part. Notice that you will not be with the same participants in one group again! The entries
you make on the next screens will be relevant for your payment as well. The resulting earnings
will be added to your earnings from the first part.
- Decisions for part 2 are made -
[Instructions Part 3]
You are now again matched with two other participants and confronted with the same decision
situation as on the previous screens. However, you face a different lottery than in the first two
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parts. Notice that again you will not be with the same participants in one group twice! The
entries you make on the next screens will be relevant for your payment as well. The resulting
earning will be added up to your earnings from the first and second part.
- Decisions for part 3 are made -
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B.2 Risk Elicitation Part
You are now going to make another series of choices. These choices will not influence your
earnings from the choices you just made, nor will your earlier choices influence the earnings from
the choices you are going to make. After you have made these choices you will be asked to answer
some questions. Thereafter the experiment will be over. In the following, you will be confronted
with a series of 7 decision situations that will appear in random order on the screen. All these
decision situations are completely independent of each other. A choice you made in one decision
situation does not affect any of the other following decision situations.
Each decision situation is displayed on a screen. The screen consists of 20 rows. You have to
decide for every row whether you prefer option A or option B. Option A is a lottery and is the
same for every choice in a given decision situation, while the secure option B takes 20 different
values, one for each choice.
This is a screen shot of one arbitrarily chosen decision situation you are going to face. You are
not asked to make choices now! Please have a careful look. At the end of the experiment one
of the 7 decision situations will be randomly selected with equal probability. Once the decision
situation is selected, one of the 20 rows in this decision situation will be randomly selected with
equal probability. The choice you have made in this specific row will determine your earnings.
Consider, for instance, the screen shot that you have just seen. Option A gives you a 20% chance
to earn 130 ECU and a 80% chance to earn 20 ECU. Option B is always a sure amount, in this
case ranging from 130 ECU in the first row, to 35 ECU in the 20th row. Suppose that the 12th
row is randomly selected. If you would have selected option B, you would receive 75 ECU. If,
instead, you would have selected option A, the outcome of the lottery determines your earnings.
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Please note that each decision situation has the same likelihood to be the one that is relevant
for your earnings. Therefore, you should view each decision independently and consider all your
choices carefully.
- Decisions for risk elicitation are made -
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